Compass is big—historically big. That is something that no one in the industry is disputing. After its acquisition of Anywhere and all that company’s brands, Compass International Holdings (a new parent company overseeing all these new subsidiaries) oversees somewhere in the range of 80,000 agents, who collectively closed half a million transactions last year.
What does Compass do with its newfound market power? That is a question nearly everyone has been asking since its mercurial Founder and CEO, Robert Reffkin, launched what has become a rapid campaign to reshape the industry.
And while only Reffkin and Compass leadership can truly answer that question, a new report from a consumer-focused researcher claims to show how the company has grown market share and power, while speculating on the industry impact.
Steven Brobeck, a senior fellow at the thinktank Consumer Policy Center (CPC), released a new analysis this week looking at the mega-brokerage’s market power, aiming to assess “market share and double-ending” in five metros—Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; Austin, Texas; San Diego, California; and Washington D.C.
Brobeck repeatedly refers to a particular benchmark set by Compass around two years ago—30% market share in 30 top metros, which Reffkin at one point said the brokerage would reach by the end of 2026. But he admitted that his insight into metros the company has “apparently targeted” was generated by AI, and that “no confirmation from a Compass source could be found” regarding the specific cities.
Brobeck further claimed that after its acquisitions, Compass holds 30% or more market share in the five aforementioned cities he selected, nearly doubling its market share in San Diego and Boston. He also said that the brokerage is likely accelerating how often it double-ends deals—that is, placing an agent affiliated with the company on both sides of a transaction.
Looking at 1,000 “recent” sales (which Brobeck said a national discount broker helped him obtain), Brobeck’s analysis shows that Compass was double-ending over 20% of sales in all five metros—though only in two cities was the rate significantly higher than competitors.
In a statement, a Compass spokesperson pushed back against these findings, noting that “the majority” of the company’s private listings that sell off-MLS are co-brokered with a non-Compass agent.
Before the Anywhere deal, a Compass spokesperson told RISMedia that the benefit of double-ended deals was not “financially meaningful” to the company.
The report
Brobeck, who authored multiple reports on commissions that were cited in the class-action Burnett and Moehrl lawsuits, wrote that the industry is currently “in flux,” and concludes with more questions than answers about what will happen related to Compass going forward.
But he also predicts that “(a)s Compass integrates Anywhere into its structure, the number of the new company’s double-ended sales is likely to rise considerably.”
“As it has expanded, Compass has challenged, worked around or flouted traditional industry rules. As a result, the whole industry—including NAR, major competitors and portals including Zillow—have been pressured into altering their own policies and practices,” he continued.
The 30% share in 30 markets hasn’t been something the company has emphasized as of late, but Brobeck posits that the company has probably already exceeded that goal in many metros following recent acquisitions—something he measured in all but one of the five cities he selected.
In San Diego, Compass went from 15.6% market share to 29.7%; in Chicago, market share jumped from 10.7% to 35%; in Washington, D.C., it rose from 22% to 39.5% and in Boston, the company leapt from 14.8% to 32.4% market share
Brobeck did not measure the post-acquisition rate of double-ended deals, instead looking at how often that occurred for “old Compass” before the acquisitions (using the same samples of 1,000 recent transactions). The highest rate was in Washington, D.C., with 41% double-ended deals, and the lowest rate was in Boston, where 21% of Compass’s sales were double-ended.
In Sn Diego, two other brands (Keller Williams and eXp) actually had a higher double-end rate than Compass according to Brobeck, and in Chicago, Compass’s double-end rate was effectively identical to the company with the next highest proportion (REMAX, which Brobeck said double-ended 23% of deals compared to Compass’s 24%).
Looking specifically at consumers, Brobeck notes that historically, “most homebuyers and sellers have not actively engaged in brokerage issues.”
But he speculates that eventually, the lack of information on listings may well drive consumers to begin looking more closely at which portals—or agents—they decide to work with.
“How the industry will evolve in the future is far from clear. It seems certain, though, that Compass’s own priorities and practices will exert a major influence on the decisions of other industry entities,” he wrote.
