“I can prove anything by statistics except the truth.”
That witticism, attributed to 19th century British orator and statesman George Canning, highlights something that remains extremely relevant today in the information age. While we have nearly unlimited access to data and analysis, they aren’t always—or perhaps often—leading us closer to the answers we seek.
Case in point: the pre-market, or “private listing” debate. On the surface, it seems that the industry could resolve this issue quantitatively. Most of the data exists in some form or another—why can’t we use some of our many extremely powerful analytical tools to find concrete, objective answers to questions regarding private listing price premiums, impacts on different racial groups, effects on inventory or propensity to create dual agency deals?
The answer is that of course, we can try. Many studies have claimed to answer these questions, one way or another. But these models often come up with conflicting results. Is this due to differences in methodology, motivation or something else? How can the industry (and you) use data to steer policy and clients in a direction that best serves everyone—whether that is toward “seller choice” or “transparency,” or perhaps both?
Here is an (incomplete) list of recent notable analyses, studies and data reports that have claimed to provide answers to questions on pre-marketing:
Redfin: “Phased marketing” will boost inventory and sale prices
Methodology: The study models the impact of uncertainty and high costs associated with listing and selling a home, focusing on price drops and the impact of “overpricing.” Using MLS data from the top 50 metros between 2023 and 2025, the analysis seeks to predict how sellers would respond to “improved pricing accuracy” and “improved privacy and convenience” from listings that start off-MLS.
Conclusion: The study says these benefits are worth 1.2%-2.4% of home’s value to the sellers who “stand most to benefit” from these marketing options, and would increase annual listings by 6%-12% in places where “phased” marketing is “widely available.”
The Context: Redfin recently struck a three-year deal with Compass to host the brokerage’s “Coming Soon” pre-market listings, after initially saying it would follow Zillow’s lead and restrict certain private listings on its platform. Rocket (which owns Redfin) and Compass both touted the potential to create more listings when they announced their partnership, though experts have expressed skepticism.
Bright MLS: Off-MLS listings take longer to sell, with no “price advantage”
Methodology: Bright MLS, the largest MLS in the country, claims to have analyzed six months of data and 100,000 sales in its mid-Atlantic footprint. Specifically, “office exclusives” (listings marketed within a single brokerage but not publicly, as part of a special exception to the Clear Cooperation Policy) are an explicit option for Bright members. The study measured time to pending and sales price, comparing listings that started as Active or Coming Soon against those that started in the Office Exclusive category.
Conclusion: While around 90% of Bright’s Office Exclusives ended up selling as Active or Coming Soon, listings that started out as Office Exclusives took, on average, 37 days longer to sell. And after controlling for property characteristics, the study found that Office Exclusive status has “no impact” on closing price. Additionally, one unnamed “broker brand” was responsible for more than 25% of all Office Exclusives, according to Bright’s data.
The Context: Bright has conducted other studies on listings that took place entirely off-MLS—including FSBOs and other “arm’s length” deals—using public records data, which would not necessarily capture pre-market properties. Pre-market champion Compass, as it has sought to pressure the MLS industry at large, highlighted Bright MLS (along with a few other MLSs) as an organization that adopted rules that favor “seller choice.”
Zillow: Two years of data show off-MLS sales going for $5,000 less
Methodology: Zillow examined “pocket listing” transactions, defined as those “seemingly” only submitted to the MLS after the purchase contract was in place—that is, reported closed or pending within a day or less on the MLS. Furthermore, Zillow only included sales that had the same agent on both sides of the deal, or at least agents from the same brokerage office, and then narrowed the focus further to properties that had previously sold on the MLS—so the analysis could verify the property details.
Additionally, Zillow used its AVM, the Zestimate, along with its Zillow Home Value Index, to account for “market-level price movements” during the analysis period, and excluded foreclosures, auctions and other outliers.
Conclusion: These “pocket listings” sold for on average, $4,975 less than on-MLS listings, totaling $1.06 billion over two years, which Zillow characterized as a “net loss to sellers.” This persisted across all price tiers, with lower-priced homes seeing the largest impacts (3.1% net loss at the lowest price tier, compared to 0.4% at luxury prices).
The Context: Zillow emerged in early 2025 as the loudest voice pushing back against private listings. It has since softened rules it implemented to restrict these listings on its platforms, while continuing to decry the kind of practices highlighted in this study—brokerages that keep listings exclusive to their company.
University of Georgia professor: Pocket listings used to sell for a premium; “agency conflict” doesn’t dictate price
Methodology: The study defines pocket listings similarly to the Zillow analysis—properties entered into the MLS with zero or one days before going under contract. Using both public records and data from a single MLS in Texas over 20 years, the study honed in on “micro-markets” of around 1 square kilometer to ensure listings were being compared to comparable properties, used an analytical technique that allows controlling of tiny variations in homes and sought careful controls over “supply dynamics” that vary over the 20-year study period.
Conclusion: Before NAR implemented the Clear Cooperation Policy in 2020, pocket listings sold for a “robust” 1.7% price premium (and a much higher 8% at luxury price levels). After Clear Cooperation, pocket listings continued, but lost the pricing advantage. The study’s author explicitly ruled out an “agency conflict” explanation for his findings—that is, price premiums were not concentrated in listings with an agent from the same brokerage on both sides.
The price premium could largely be attributed to the avoidance of price drops and negotiating pressure, and consumer demand for these listings were a “rational” response by consumers looking for certainty and privacy, according to Darren K. Hayunga, the author. For most of the years included in the data, pocket listings made up only a fraction of a percentage of sales, but rose as high as 3% in the early 2020s.
The study did not seek to examine potential discriminatory effects created by pocket listings, but noted that other recent research found pocket listings can further racial segregation in housing.
Context: The study has been submitted to the Journal of Urban Economics, but has not yet been published (at press time). Hayunga previously told RISMedia the paper can’t fully explain why Clear Cooperation curbed the price premium. It is seemingly the only recent independent and academic study of pre-marketing or “pocket listings,” and proponents of the practice have touted its conclusions as supporting the principles of their business models—notably, Compass CEO Robert Reffkin highlighted the study multiple times on social media.
Compass: Pre-marketed listings get “better outcomes,” higher prices
Methodology: The brokerage looked at Compass’s closed sell-side transactions in 2024, including all property types and regions where the company operates, and controlled for property characteristics and seasonality, at a 95% confidence interval. It specifically compared listings that went through Compass’s “three-phase marketing plan,” which (usually) includes a “Private Exclusives” phase as well as a “Coming Soon” phase before MLS submission.
Conclusion: Compass pre-marketed properties sold for between 1.9% and 3.9% more than properties added straight to the MLS. The study also found that the Compass pre-market properties received offers 20% faster, and were 30% less likely to receive a price drop.
Context: Compass has been the leading champion of pre-marketing, and has pushed the practice aggressively both internally and externally as the brokerage heavily invests in its programs. A Compass spokesperson defended the results of this study in a previous conversation with RISMedia, noting that as a public company, its statements and analyses are regulated and scrutinized. Compass has also characterized the study as “early findings,” even as the brokerage has offered Private Exclusives since at least 2019.
